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Understanding and predicting how individuals perform in high-pressure sit-
uations is of importance in designing and managing workplaces, but also in
other areas of society such as disaster management or professional sports. For
simple effort tasks, an increase in the pressure experienced by an individual,
e.g. due to incentive schemes in a workplace, will increase the effort put into
the task and hence in most cases also the performance. However, for skill
tasks, there exists a substantial body of literature that fairly consistently re-
ports a choking phenomenon, where individuals exposed to pressure do in fact
perform worse than in non-pressure situations. However, we argue that many
of the corresponding studies have crucial limitations, such as neglected inter-
action effects or insufficient numbers of observations to allow within-individual
analysis. We also diagnose some degree of confusion in the literature regarding
the differentiation between skill and effort tasks, which, assuming the choking
phenomenon in case of skill tasks to be real, would in fact be assumed to be
orthogonally impacted by pressure. Focusing on the more complex and usually
harder to capture case of skill tasks, here we investigate performance under
pressure in professional darts as a near-ideal setting with no direct interaction
between players and a high number of observations per subject. We analyze
almost one year of tournament data covering 23,192 dart throws, hence a data
set that is very much larger than those used in most previous studies. We find
strong evidence for an overall improved performance under pressure, for nearly
all 83 players in the sample. Contrary to what would be expected given the
evidence in favor of a choking phenomenon, we hence find that professional
darts players excel at performing skill tasks under high pressure. These re-
sults could have important consequences for our understanding of how highly
skilled individuals deal with high-pressure situations.
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1 Introduction
The effect of pressure on human performance is relevant in various areas of the society,
including sports competitions (Hill et al., 2010), political crises (Boin et al., 2016), and
performance-based payment in workplaces (Ariely et al., 2009), to name but a few. A
broad distinction differentiates between effort and skill tasks. Success in effort tasks is
dependent on motivation to perform while skill task outcome underlies precision of (often
automatic) execution. For effort tasks, such as counting digits (Konow, 2000) or filling
envelopes (Abeler et al., 2011), individuals will typically respond to increased pressure
(e.g. resulting from performance-related payment schemes) by investing more effort, which
given the nature of such tasks will improve their performance (Lazear, 2000; Paarsch
and Shearer, 1999, 2000; Prendergast, 1999). However, there is broad agreement in the
literature that performance in skill tasks, e.g. juggling a soccer ball (Ali, 2011), declines
in high-pressure or decisive situations, commonly referred to as “choking under pressure”.
According to Beilock and Gray (2007), an individual is choking under pressure when
their performance is worse than expected given their capabilities and past performances.
While there may also be random fluctuations in skill levels, choking under pressure refers
to systematic suboptimal performance in high-pressure situations.
Choking under pressure can be caused by changes in the execution of actions, or simply
distraction, generated either by rewards in case of success (Baumeister, 1984; Ariely et al.,
2009) or potential penalties in case of failure (Kleine et al., 1988). Empirical findings
related to performance under pressure — both such that are based on experimental data
but also those using field data — consistently confirm a negative impact of pressure on
skill tasks. Studies using field data often focus on sports, e.g. penalty kicks in soccer, free
throws in basketball, or putting in golf. While the existing literature seems to provide
overwhelming evidence in favor of the choking under pressure phenomenon, we believe that
most of the existing studies have crucial limitations, most notably neglected interaction
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effects between competitors and misleading benchmarks for performance in non-pressure
situations. Second, reported results often mix effort and skill tasks despite the projected
contrary impact of pressure on performance.
Here we use a large data set from professional darts, comprising 23,192 individual
dart throws, for a comprehensive empirical test of the choking under pressure theory.
For the professional darts player analyzed in this study, playing darts is a full time job.
The top players regularly earn prize money exceeding one million Euro per year. In
professional darts, highly skilled players repeatedly throw at the dartboard from the
exact same position effectively without any interaction between competitors, making the
task highly standardized. The high level of standardization of individual throws as well as
the very many repetitions of almost identical actions, performed by professionals, renders
darts a near-ideal setting for measuring the effect of pressure on performance. The amount
of data available on throwing performances not only allows for comprehensive inference
on the existence and the magnitude of any potential effect of pressure on performance,
but also enables to track the variability of the effect across players. As pointed out by
McEwan et al. (2013), throwing darts is a skill task as it refers to a highly standardized
movement which requires a high motor skill in order to perform well. Hence, following
the literature, performance in darts would be expected to decline as pressure increases.
Against the current state of research on motor tasks, we find (nearly all) professional darts
players to excel in pressure situations. We argue that highly skilled individuals are able
to digest pressure situations towards a positive outcome, while those who choke under
pressure decide towards other professions. This emphasizes the importance of possession
of skills for the impact of pressure on performance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on performance
under pressure, and in particular details what we consider to be crucial limitations of
existing studies. In Section 3, we explain the rules of darts and define what constitutes a
pressure situation in darts. Section 4 presents the empirical approach and results. Section
5 provides further indication that throwing darts is a skill task.
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2 Performance and Choking Under Pressure
2.1 Terminology
Pressure results from individuals’ ambitions to perform in an optimal way in situations
where high-level performance is in demand (Baumeister, 1984). Performance under pres-
sure could in principle go either way, i.e. high expectations towards (the own) performance
could impact performance in a negative or a positive way (or not at all). To measure the
impact of pressure, performance in pressure situations is compared to performance in
non-pressure situations. Choking under pressure refers specifically to a negative impact
of high performance expectations (Baumeister and Showers, 1986; Hill et al., 2009).
2.2 Theories on Impact of Pressure
The impact of pressure on performance crucially depends on the type of task to be per-
formed. Tasks can be such that performance is determined mostly by effort, or alterna-
tively a task can be such that the skill level is the key factor for success. For effort tasks,
pressure situations result in increased effort and hence improved performance (Rosen,
1986). For skill tasks, performance has repeatedly been demonstrated to be impaired
by pressure, which is commonly referred to as choking under pressure (Wallace et al.,
2005). While the effect of pressure on effort tasks is obvious, in skill tasks the potential
psychological factors at play are likely more complex, such that we focus on these tasks
in the following.
Choking under pressure in skill tasks may be related to various drivers. In particular,
different skills may make use of different memory functions, namely explicit and procedural
memory, respectively (Beilock, 2010). Explicit memory enables the intentional recollection
of factual information, while procedural memory works without conscious awareness and
helps at performing tasks. Two classes of attentional theories capture choking under
pressure, distraction theories and explicit monitoring theories (DeCaro et al., 2011; Hill
et al., 2010).1 Distraction theories claim high-pressure situations to harm performance
1Some authors argue that distraction and explicit monitoring theories are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, but rather complementary (see e.g. Beilock and Carr, 2001a; Sanders and Walia, 2012).
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by putting individuals’ attention to task irrelevant thoughts (Beilock and Carr, 2001a;
Lewis and Linder, 1997). Put in a nutshell, individuals concern about two tasks at once,
since the situation-related thoughts add to the task to be performed. Given the restricted
working memory individuals performance declines as focus is drawn away from the task
(Engle, 2002).
On the other hand, self-focus or explicit monitoring theories explicitly predict that pres-
sure increases self-consciousness to a point where it harms performance (overattention). It
can cause the skilled performer to deviate from routine actions or, put differently, to uti-
lize the procedural memory less (Markman et al., 2006). Instead, closer attention is paid
to the processes of performance and its step-by-step control. This ties in with the concept
of skill acquisition: when initially learning a skill, performance is controlled consciously
by explicit knowledge as skills are executed step-by-step (Anderson, 1982). Over time
and through practice, skills become internalized and usage of conscious control decreases.
Pressure can interfere with this now automated control processes of skilled performers
(Wulf and Su, 2007). Under pressure, actions are no longer executed automatically as
attention is redirected to task execution (DeCaro et al., 2011). The overall sequence of
actions is broken down into step-by-step control as in early stages of learning, resulting
in impaired performance (Masters, 1992). Consequently, individuals consciously monitor
and control a skill they would perform automatically in non-pressure situations (Jackson
et al., 2006; DeCaro et al., 2011).
2.3 Empirical Findings for Performance under Pressure in Skill Tasks
As this paper analyses performance under pressure in a sport-related skill task, this section
is devoted to previous findings from sports.2 In an experimental setting Lewis and Linder
(1997) discover golf putting performance to be worse when subjects are put under pressure.
However, in high-pressure situations participants who are distracted by a secondary task
(counting down from 100) outperform subjects who solely concentrate on the putting task.
The latter result is explained by too much focus on the task execution induced by the
2Early non-sport studies include Baumeister (1984); Heaton and Sigall (1991).
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additional motivation to perform well in high-pressure conditions. The additional focus
disturbs task execution which normally is performed automatically. Further evidence
for diminishing golf putting performance under pressure is presented by Beilock and Carr
(2001b) who ask 108 undergraduate students with little or no golf experience to putt a golf
ball as close to a target as possible. Considering different kinds of intervention methods,
the authors create pressure-like situations using monetary incentives. Results generally
confirm decreasing performance for high-pressure situations. However, the authors show
putting accuracy to slightly increase under pressure when subjects had made their practice
putts under self-consciousness-raising conditions.
For a hockey dribbling task with 34 experienced participants, Jackson et al. (2006)
find that performance is worse in high-pressure situations. Results further show that
within high and low-pressure conditions subjects perform better when not concentrating
explicitly on the task execution. Using a hockey dribbling setting with experienced hockey
players, Ashford and Jackson (2010) present additional evidence for declining performance
in pressure situations. However, Ashford and Jackson demonstrate that in a high-pressure
priming condition, performances are equal to those in a low-pressure situation and better
(thus faster) than in a high-pressure non-priming condition.
Liao and Masters (2002) show decreasing free throw success for basketball novices in
pressure situations. This result only applies to those subjects who are asked to pay close
attention to the execution process during the practicing phase. Analyzing free throw
performances of competitive basketball players instead of novices, Wang et al. (2004) find
supporting results. Thus, participants suffer a significant decrease in free throw success
when performing in a high-pressure situation induced by the introduction of an audience,
videotaping and offering financial rewards for improved performance.
Mesagno et al. (2012) study the impact which the fear of negative evaluation has on
choking under pressure. For short distance throwing of a basketball3 under pressure
conditions the authors only find decreasing performance (thus choking) for participants
who were anxious about being evaluated negatively. For other subjects no significant
3Shots are taken from five different spots which all are placed at the distance of the free throw line.
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difference in throwing success is found.
Outside of experiments, field studies take advantage of the wealth of data on actual
market participants who repeatedly perform almost identical tasks but under varying
degrees of pressure. Pressure in these instances is determined by factors such as the
importance of the competition considered, the current score in the competition, and the
time left to play in a match.
Penalty kicks in soccer are considered to be a prototype pressure situation, as they
critically affect the match outcome and the expectation to score a goal is very high. In
line with the hypothesis of individuals tending to choke under pressure at skill tasks,
Dohmen (2008) finds success rates of penalty kicks in professional football to decline with
increasing importance of success, i.e. as pressure increases. However, contradictory to
these results, Kocher et al. (2008) show success rates in penalty shootouts to increase
with pressure in the German cup competition. Kocher et al. (2012) and Apesteguia
and Palacios-Huerta (2010) focus on the “last-mover disadvantage”, i.e. whether teams
that go first in a shootout have an advantage over the other team resulting from higher
pressure from trailing. While Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) find that last-mover
teams indeed suffer from this kind of pressure, Kocher et al. (2012) refute this finding and
speculate the contradictory results to be a consequence of issues with the data considered.
Potential reasons for varying success in penalty shootouts between players are covered
by Jordet (2009), where it is found that players from high-status countries a) generally
perform worse and b) engage more in escapist self-regulation strategies than players from
low status-countries.
In golf, performance under pressure in analyzed for putting. Clark III (2002b,a) ana-
lyzes the impact of the current scoreboard situation on performance and finds that interim
results are irrelevant for performance. In particular players who are in the lead or close to
the lead in the final round do not perform worse than those who are further behind. Fur-
thermore, players’ performances are constant across rounds. Wells and Skowronski (2012)
state that between-athlete comparisons may explain this finding, which is not in line with
the widely accepted hypothesis of individuals choking under pressure. Considering also
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within-golfer comparisons, Wells and Skowronski (2012) cannot replicate Clark’s findings,
and instead do find athletes to choke under pressure. Relating choking under pressure
to golfers’ age, Fried and Tauer (2011) show an inverted U-shaped relationship on the
professionals’ tour with performance under pressure peaking at age 36. Finally, Hickman
and Metz (2015) determine the success rate at the final putt of a golf tournament to
decrease as the value associated with that shot increases.
Basketball free throws constitute another scenario that is often considered to investigate
performance under pressure. Considering data from the National Basketball Association
(NBA), Worthy et al. (2009) model free throw success rates as a function of the current
score, focusing on closely contested games in the final minutes. While players are shown to
perform much worse when their team either is trailing by 1 or 2 points, or in the lead with 1
point, more attempts are successful when the score is tied (which equals less pressure since
a miss would end in an overtime and not a loss). Cao et al. (2011) also report evidence
for choking under pressure in professional basketball, with performance declining with
additional pressure (specifically: less time remaining, closer games). However, they show
performance to be unaffected by the crowd size, the tournament round, and whether or
not it is a home game for the player considered. Examining the determinants of choking
under pressure, Toma (2017) finds overall lower free-throw success rates for all groups
considered, i.e. females and males, amateurs and professionals, in case of high-pressure
situations.
While some contradictory results have been reported, overall there still seems to be
fairly clear evidence that professional athletes do choke under pressure, at least in some
scenarios. However, below we argue that many of the existing studies have major limita-
tions, and hence question the generalization of the findings.
2.4 Caveats of Existing Studies & Data
Despite the substantial effort that has gone into studying the impact of pressure of perfor-
mance, here we question whether compelling evidence for choking under pressure has yet
been found. Generally, empirical work often lacks a clear distinction between skill and
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effort tasks, which however is of crucial importance given that the expected impact of
pressure is depending on the type of task at hand. More specifically, we see the following
caveats in existing studies.
First, data on penalty kicks in soccer involves the major disadvantage that the success
probability depends on the performance of two interacting individuals. Thus, missing a
penalty shot can be due to the kicker’s or the goalkeeper’s performance, respectively, or
in fact both (Jordet and Hartman, 2008; Jordet, 2009). In order to precisely measure
the impact of pressure, analyses need to focus on performance that is not affected by
others (Baumeister and Steinhilber, 1984). Second, experimental studies of choking un-
der pressure typically ask subjects to perform tasks they are not trained in (Dohmen,
2008; Kocher et al., 2012), a circumstance that makes it difficult to describe a baseline
performance level for these individuals in non-pressure situations, and subsequently un-
cover deviations in pressure situations. It also seems likely that untrained individuals
will not exhibit the same reaction to pressure as highly skilled professionals. Third and
closely related to the previous point, the tasks to be performed in a pressure situation
are often unusual to the subject. This applies not only to experimental data, but also to
data on penalty kicks — as argued by Feri et al. (2013), penalty kicks constitute only a
small fraction of actions a soccer player need to perform. Consequently, the number of
observations per subject — if there are any — is often very low, which is likely to lead
to very noisy estimations (Gelman, 2018). As highlighted by Beilock and Gray (2007),
suboptimal performance is not just a random fluctuation in performance, but the overall
response to a high-pressure situation. Estimating skill levels in pressure situations re-
quires the separation of signal and (potentially very large) noise, which is only possible
provided that the data set considered is comprehensive. Fourth, with respect to penalty
kicks as well as basketball free throws, team managers often rely on the same set of players
when confronted with pressure situations, namely those who they have faith in to deal
with the pressure (Dohmen, 2008). Accordingly, managers avoid making use of those
players who choke under pressure, leading to endogeneity for team sport settings. Fifth
and mainly concerning professional golf, in noisy settings, it is statistically challenging to
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separate the effect of pressure from nuisance effects such as wind or weather conditions,
position of the ball, or quality of the course. Sixth, in sports like soccer and basketball,
crucial situations occur late in the game when athletes have increased levels of fatigue.
Corresponding investigations of performance under pressure thus focus on very specific
settings, and it is not clear whether athletes that choke under pressure when exhausted
would also do so under normal circumstances.
Overall, while it is difficult to test for any actual bias that may have crept into existing
studies, we believe that there is sufficient reason to doubt the generality of existing find-
ings, and hence argue that further studies, with better data and less confounding factors,
are required in order to arrive at conclusive results regarding the effect of pressure on
performance.
3 Pressure Situations in Darts
Professional darts is a nearly optimal setting for investigating performance under pressure.
Professional players repeatedly perform highly standardized actions, with no interference
by an opponent or any teammates involved, and hardly any relevant external factors.
Furthermore, throwing darts with high precision clearly is a skill task. Through years
of practice the throwing motion becomes increasingly automatized. Performance then is
no longer the result from a step-by-step process but rather from an automated sequence
of movements. Considering the previous research in this area, we would therefore ex-
pect pressure to negatively affect performance. It is worth noting here that we focus on
highly-trained athletes who deal with pressure on a regular basis, rather than amateurs
in experimental settings (Hickman and Metz, 2015). It is not clear per se whether the
effect of pressure is the same across such different types of individuals.
For readers who may be unfamiliar with the rules of darts, we here provide a short
description. The dartboard consists of 20 different slices, which differ with respect to their
value (ranging from 1 to 20), and the center of the board, which is composed of two fields,
namely the single bull and the bullseye. Each slice is further divided into three different
parts: two single, one double and one triple field. The bullseye is the double field of the
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single bull. Figure 1 shows the layout of a standard dartboard, highlighting the single five
segment, the double and triple eight, respectively, and the single bull together with the
bullseye. The inside width of the triple and double fields is 8mm, whereas the diameter of
the bullseye is 12.7mm. A dart match is typically played by two players. (There are cases
of team competitions in darts but these are not considered in our analysis.) Players are
standing 2.37m away from the dartboard (at the “oche”), the height of which is 1.73m
(from the ground to the center of the bullseye). Figure 2 shows this setting.
While there are many possible games in darts, professional darts commonly follow the
501 up format. In order to win a corresponding match, a player must be the first to win
a pre-specified number of legs (typically between 7 and 15). Both players start each leg
with 501 points, and the first player to reach exactly zero points wins the leg, with the
restriction that the dart that ultimately reduces the points to zero must hit a double field.
For instance, in case a player throws a dart at the single/double/triple field of segment
20, 20/40/60 points are deducted from the player’s current score. The players take turns
to throw three darts in quick succession. At the beginning of a leg, players consistently
aim at high numbers — usually triple 20 or triple 19 — to quickly reduce their points.
The maximum score per dart is 60 (triple 20) and hence 180 for a set of three darts.
Once a player has the possibility to finish a leg (i.e. reach exactly zero points) with
three darts (or less) during his turn, he is in the finish region. If he takes the opportunity
and finishes the leg, this is called a checkout. As the last single dart has to hit a double
field, the highest possible checkout is 170: two darts at triple 20 (2× 60 = 120) followed
by a dart into the bullseye (50 points). The highest checkout not requiring a bullseye is
160 (two triple 20 followed by a double 20). For some scores below 170 there are multiple
combinations for a checkout while there are none for others (e.g. 159 points as there is
no three dart combination that leads to exactly zero points with the last dart hitting a
double field4).
We classify how close a player is to checking out by differentiating between 1-Dart-
4159 points could be reduced to exactly zero points with three darts if the last dart does not need to
hit a double field, e.g. by triple 20 – triple 20 – triple 13. However, since all tournaments in our data are
played as “double out”, 159 points can not be reduced to zero within a players’ turn.
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triple field
double field
bullseye
single bull
single
Figure 1: Dartboard layout.
2.37m
oche
dartboard
1.73m
Figure 2: Player position relative to dartboard.
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Finish, 2-Dart-Finish, 3-Dart-Finish and no finish. Within a 1-Dart-Finish the player is
able to checkout with only one dart, e.g. in case he has 20 points left prior to his first
throw he can checkout by hitting the double ten. Similarly, a 2-Dart-Finish describes a
situation where two darts are needed to checkout, e.g. in case 58 points are left it is not
possible to checkout with a single dart, but for example by a 20 followed by a double
19. Scores that need at least three darts for checkout are defined as a 3-Dart-Finish, for
example 133 points left, which can be checked out via triple 20, triple 19 and double 8.
No finish describes situations in which it is not possible to checkout (e.g. because too
many points are left or no three dart combination exists that leads to zero points).
The possibility to checkout represents the strongest pressure situation in darts, as in
these situations a player can win a leg but also effectively lose a leg (if the opponent is
likely to checkout in his next turn). For any given turn of a player, the level of pressure is
a result from the combination of the player’s own likelihood of finishing within the current
turn as well as that of the opponent finishing within his next turn. Table 1 summarizes
the empirical proportions found in our data for winning a leg given the finish of a player
(stated in the columns) and the finish of the opponent (stated in the rows). For a 1-Dart-
Finish of a player, the situation where his opponent also has the possibility to checkout
does not represent a situation of particularly high pressure, since the player has three
darts to hit the targeted double. Furthermore, for this scenario, the empirical proportion
for winning the leg is at least about 80%. If a player has a 2-Dart-Finish, and in case
his opponent has a 3-Dart-Finish (OppFin3 ), he is still ahead of his opponent and will
not feel much pressure, in relative terms, especially compared to the pressure situation
where his opponent is in front, i.e. for the case where his opponent has a 1-Dart-Finish
(OppFin1 ). This classification of the pressure situations again occurs from the empirical
proportions of winning a leg, as these decrease to 61.2% for the mentioned scenario. The
same argument applies for the 3-Dart-Finish of a player, where the pressure is highest
for the situation where the opponent has a 1-Dart-Finish. In this situation, the empirical
proportion of winning a leg is only 28.2% and, hence, represents the situation with highest
pressure. All possible combinations where the opponent has no finish (OppNoFin) are
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situations where the player is not under pressure. Table 2 summarizes these different
levels of pressure, where the levels of pressure can be directly deduced from the empirical
proportions in Table 1. If players indeed choke under pressure one would assume a lower
probability of checking out if the chances of the opponent to checkout with the next
try increase.5 For a given finish (1-Dart-Finish, 2-Dart-Finish or 3-Dart-Finish) and in
line with the choking under pressure literature we assume that a player’s probability of
checking out – ceteris paribus – increases in the number of darts needed by the opponent
to check out.
Table 1: Empirical proportions of winning a leg under varying finish regions of player and
opponent.
1-Dart-Finish 2-Dart-Finish 3-Dart-Finish
OppFin1 0.812 (2,368) 0.612 (2,536) 0.282 (1,902)
OppFin2 0.854 (1,969) 0.697 (2,700) 0.415 (2,533)
OppFin3 0.925 (936) 0.845 (1,605) 0.677 (2,250)
OppNoFin 0.962 (496) 0.938 (1,353) 0.856 (2,544)
Note: number of observations in parentheses
Table 2: Classification of pressure situations.
1-Dart-Finish 2-Dart-Finish 3-Dart-Finish
OppFin1 low pressure moderate pressure high pressure
OppFin2 low pressure moderate pressure moderate pressure
OppFin3 low pressure low pressure moderate pressure
OppNoFin no pressure no pressure no pressure
4 Empirical Analysis
The data – extracted from http://live.dartsdata.com/ – covers all professional darts
tournaments organized by the Professional Darts Corporation (PDC) between April 2017
and January 2018. Based on the raw data it was possible to reconstruct which player
5For clarity imagine a situation where a player approaches the board with a 3-Dart-Finish. The
pressure on him is lowest if his opponent is in the position of no finish since he knows that his opponent
cannot checkout in case he fails to finish himself and, hence, will have another turn after his current one.
In comparison the pressure on the player is highest if his opponent has a 1-Dart-Finish. In case the player
does not succeed, the chances of his opponent to win the leg with his next turn are very high (at around
75 percent in our sample).
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makes a throw, the score before each dart, how many legs have been played in the match,
which player had the first throw in any leg considered and, of course, if the player making
a throw checks out. In the data we analyze, each row, i.e. observation, corresponds to a
player’s turn to throw (at most) three darts. From those rows, i.e. from all sets of three
darts played by a player, we consider only those instances where a player has the chance
to check out within the given turn.6 To ensure reliable inference on player-specific effects,
we further reduced the dataset to consider only those players who had at least 50 attempts
to check out. The final data set comprises information on the checkout performances of
m = 83 different players, totaling to n = 23, 192 observations (checkout yes/no).
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Our response variable Checkout indicates whether a player managed to checkout (coded
as “Checkout = 1”) or not (“Checkout = 0”). As detailed in Section 3, we measure the
degree of pressure on a player by differentiating between his and his opponents’ chances
to finish a leg prior to his turn. The different ways to win a leg here refer to the minimum
number of darts a player needs to checkout in his upcoming turn. We distinguish between
a 3-Dart-, 2-Dart- or 1-Dart-Finish of the player. For the opponent, the covariates for the
type of the finish are OppFin1, OppFin2, OppFin3 and OppNoFin, indicating whether
the opponent has a 3-Dart-, 2-Dart-, 1-Dart-Finish or no finish, respectively. Finally, as
our data contains trained athletes, we are able to further control for the experience of
the athletes (Exper), proxied by the number of years the players belong to a professional
darts organization (BDO or PDC). Table 3 summarizes all covariates considered.
As can be seen in Table 4, about 39% of all finishes are successful checkouts. However,
the probability to successfully complete a checkout varies considerably with the number
of darts required to do so: the more darts are needed, the less likely is a checkout. At
this point still neglecting the opponents’ score, players check out when having a 3-Dart-
6More specifically, the data indicate that for very few situations where a player has a 1-Dart-Finish
and the opponent has no finish, the player does not always try to check out. For example, when having
10 points left, players sometimes go for the single two to have eight points left. Otherwise, if they throw
at the double five and hit the single five, they have five points left which can not be reduced to zero with
one dart as the last dart has to hit a double field. Hence, we excluded all throws where the player did
not try to check out with his last dart, resulting in 11 removed observations.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the covariates.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Checkout 23,192 0.390 – 0 1
OppNoFin 23,192 0.189 – 0 1
OppFin1 23,192 0.293 – 0 1
OppFin2 23,192 0.311 – 0 1
OppFin3 23,192 0.207 – 0 1
Exper 23,192 13.31 7.595 1 36
Table 4: Empirical proportions for a checkout under varying finish regions.
Obs Checkout = 1
1-Dart-Finish 5,769 0.762
2-Dart-Finish 8,194 0.471
3-Dart-Finish 9,229 0.085
total 23,192 0.390
Finish in only about 9%, when having a 2-Dart-Finish in about 47% and when having a
1-Dart-Finish in about 76% of all cases.
Table 5: Empirical checkout proportions under varying finish regions of player and
opponent.
1-Dart-Finish 2-Dart-Finish 3-Dart-Finish
OppFin1 0.757 (2,368) 0.496 (2,536) 0.114 (1,902)
OppFin2 0.763 (1,969) 0.478 (2,700) 0.093 (2,533)
OppFin3 0.770 (936) 0.447 (1,605) 0.080 (2,250)
OppNoFin 0.770 (496) 0.435 (1,353) 0.061 (2,544)
Note: number of observations in parentheses
Table 5 additionally includes information on opponents’ possibilities to finish a leg. It
shows all combinations of players’ and the opponents’ finish regions together with the
corresponding empirical proportions of successful checkouts. The corresponding num-
ber of observations for each situation is shown in parentheses. For a 1-Dart-Finish, the
checkout proportions do not vary considerably across the opponents’ finish region. In
contrast, for both the 2-Dart-Finish and also the 3-Dart-Finish, there are notable differ-
ences in the checkout proportions across the different finish regions of the opponent. For
2-Dart-Finishes, the checkout proportion increases as the opponent’s chance to success-
fully complete a checkout is increased, i.e. for situations associated with higher pressure.
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The same holds for 3-Dart-Finishes, since the checkout proportion almost doubles from
situations where the opponent cannot checkout and hence does not apply much pressure
(0.061) to the situation where the opponent has a 1-Dart-Finish, i.e. situations of high
pressure (0.114).
4.2 Modelling Checkout Performance
The structure of the data considered is longitudinal, as we model the binary response
variable Checkout ij, indicating whether or not the i–th player (i = 1, . . . ,m) checked out
(Checkout ij = 1) on the j–th attempt (j = 1, . . . , ni). To cover player-specific effects,
and also to account for the fact that each individual player’s observations are likely to
be correlated, we apply generalised linear mixed models where the linear predictor ηij
contains a vector of fixed effects β as well as a vector of zero-mean random effects γi:
ηij = x
′
ijβ + u
′
ijγi, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , ni,
with xij = (1,OppFin1ij, . . .)
′, and u′ij the subvector of x
′
ij with those covariates for
which we assume individual-specific effects. The logit function links the binary response
variable, Checkout ij, to the linear predictor:
logit
(
Pr(Checkoutij = 1|γi)
)
= ηij = x
′
ijβ + u
′
ijγi.
The linear predictor for Model 1 includes all covariates considered as well as a random
intercept for each player to account for player-specific effects:
ηij = β0 + β1OppFin1ij + β2OppFin2ij + β3OppFin3ij + β4Experi + γ0i.
The random intercept γ0i displays the player-specific deviation from the average inter-
cept β0 — further individual-specific effects will be considered below. For the covariates
OppFin1 /OppFin2 /OppFin3, the reference category is OppNoFin. Since the descriptive
analysis showed that the magnitude of the effect of the finish of the opponent is likely
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to vary across the player’s finish considered, we estimate Model 1 three times separately
using only 1-Dart, 2-Dart and 3-Dart-Finish data. These models are fitted by maximum
likelihood estimation using the package lme4 (Bates et al. 2015) in R (R Core Team,
2017). Table 6 displays the results for the corresponding fixed effects.
Table 6: Estimation results for the fixed effects of Model 1.
Response variable:
Checkout
1-Dart-Finish 2-Dart-Finish 3-Dart-Finish
OppFin1 −0.067 0.267∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.068) (0.110)
OppFin2 −0.038 0.184∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.067) (0.108)
OppFin3 0.002 0.057 0.285∗∗
(0.132) (0.075) (0.114)
OppNoFin reference category
Exper 0.0004 0.008∗ 0.010
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Constant 1.186∗∗∗ −0.424∗∗∗ −2.916∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.080) (0.124)
Observations 5,769 8,194 9,229
AIC 6,334 11,294 5,341
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The estimated coefficients associated with OppFin1, OppFin2 and OppFin3 are of
main interest here as they display the impact of the opponent’s chance of checking out
during his next attempt. For the 1-Dart-Finish of a player, the pressure situation has no
statistically significant effect on the checkout. However, for the 2-Dart-Finish as well as the
3-Dart-Finish, the various effects of the dummy variables indicating whether the opponent
has a finish are all estimated to be positive, and most are statistically significant. For
example, when a player has a 2-Dart-Finish, then a 1-Dart-Finish of the opponent — all
other covariates held constant — increases the odds of checking out by exp(0.267) = 1.31
relative to a situation where the opponent has no finish. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly,
evaluating the effects of OppFin1, OppFin2 and OppFin3 across the three models, the
more pressure a player is exposed to, i.e. the less number of darts the opponent needs for
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a checkout, the higher is the increase in the corresponding odds for a checkout. Regarding
the 1-Dart-Finish, players generally do not feel much pressure as they have three darts to
hit the required double field. For this situation, we do not observe any significant effect
of the OppFin1, OppFin2 and OppFin3 covariates, respectively. For a 2-Dart-Finish,
players are under little pressure if their opponent has a 3-Dart-Finish, since it is likely
that they will have another turn to check out, as the opponent has to hit the targeted three
fields perfectly in order to win the leg in his next turn (and note the empirical proportion
for checking out when having a 3-Dart-Finish is about 0.085, see Table 4). However, if
the opponent has a 1-Dart-Finish or a 2-Dart-Finish, then players are exposed to more
pressure as they know that for these situations it is more likely that their opponent will
check out during his next turn. For these pressure situations, the odds for a checkout
increase compared to a situation where the opponent does not have the possibility to
check out. For a 3-Dart-Finish of any player considered, the same arguments apply, with
the main difference being that the pressure is higher overall, since all 3 darts (rather than
just 2) have to find their target. Notably, the estimated effects are in contrast to the
widely accepted theory regarding choking under pressure, as discussed above.
The player-specific random intercepts γˆ0i, i.e. the player-specific deviations from the
intercept βˆ0, vary (on the logistic scale) between −0.104 and 0.239 for the 1-Dart-Finish,
between −0.208 and 0.381 for the 2-Dart-Finish and between −0.200 and 0.383 for the
3-Dart-Finish, respectively. To provide a better understanding and intuition of the player-
specific effects, and of all three estimations of Model 1 in general, Figure 3 shows the
predicted values for Checkout for each combination of the players’ finish and the one of
the opponent. Thus, for each player there is one line for each of his own possible finishes
(indicated by the three different colors), showing the predicted probability of finishing a
leg as a function of the number of darts needed by the opponent in his next attempt.
Thus, Figure 3 summarizes several aspects of the fitted models as reported in Table 6:
first, as indicated by the player-specific random intercepts, there are huge differences
between the players’ checkout performances; second, for the 1-Dart-Finish of a player, the
checkout probability is not affected by the finish situation of the opponent; and third, for
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the 2-Dart-Finish as well as the 3-Dart-Finish of a player, the probability for checking out
increases as the likelihood of a successful finish of the opponent increase, i.e. the more a
player is under pressure.
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
no Finish 3−Dart−Finish 2−Dart−Finish 1−Dart−Finish
Finish of the opponent
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 C
he
ck
o
u
t
Own Finish
1−Dart−Finish
2−Dart−Finish
3−Dart−Finish
Figure 3: Predicted Checkout values according to Model 1. More specifically, for each of
the 83 players we predict the Checkout for all combinations of the own finish
(yellow, blue and green lines) and the finish of the opponent.
Figure 3 also highlights an implicit assumption of Model 1 namely that the effect of
the dummies OppFin1, OppFin2 and OppFin3 is the same for each player. To investi-
gate whether the 83 players in the data to indeed respond in the same way to pressure
situations, we extended Model 1 to include additional zero-mean random effects, γ1i, γ2i
and γ3i, which represent the player-specific deviations from the fixed effects β1, β2 and β3,
leading to Model 2 :
ηij = β0 + β1OppFin1ij + β2OppFin2ij + β3OppFin3ij + β4Experi
+ γ0i + γ1iOppFin1ij + γ2iOppFin2ij + γ3iOppFin3ij.
As for Model 1, we estimated Model 2 for each subsample of possible finishes separately.
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Table 7 display the corresponding results, indicating that the fixed effects change only
slightly compared to Model 1, both in terms of the direction of the effect and also its
magnitude. The estimated random effects γˆ1i, γˆ2i and γˆ3i imply that for 2-Dart and
3-Dart-Finishes of a player, only two players do not improve if their opponent has a 2-
Dart-Finish (compared to a situation where the opponent has no finish), and all players
improve if the opponent has a 1-Dart-Finish, respectively. Table 8 summarizes these
results and displays how many out of the 83 players in our sample improve their odds
for a checkout when facing pressure situations. Thus, the empty cells in Table 8 display
the non-pressure situations which were pointed out above. While Model 2 provides some
insights regarding player-specific performances under pressure, Model 2 does not yield an
improvement in the AIC compared to Model 1 for any of the subsamples modeled.
Table 7: Estimation results for the fixed effects of Model 2.
Response variable:
Checkout
1-Dart-Finish 2-Dart-Finish 3-Dart-Finish
OppFin1 −0.118 0.279∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.077) (0.123)
OppFin2 −0.089 0.226∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.079) (0.115)
OppFin3 −0.050 0.086 0.254∗∗
(0.159) (0.088) (0.125)
OppNoFin reference category
Exper 0.001 0.008∗ 0.011∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Constant 1.227∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −2.913∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.087) (0.127)
Observations 5,769 8,194 9,229
AIC 6,349 11,304 5,358
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8: Number of players (out of n = 83) that improve under pressure according to
Model 2.
1-Dart-Finish 2-Dart-Finish 3-Dart-Finish
OppFin1 – 83 83
OppFin2 – 81 83
OppFin3 – – 83
5 Throwing Darts — Skill or Effort Task?
As pointed out above, throwing darts reflects a skill and not an effort task. It takes
not much effort to throw the light-weighted dart towards the dart board. However, a
high level of concentration and calm are needed in order to be successful. Because the
distinction between effort and skill task is critical to the expected impact of pressure on
performance, this section empirically tackles if incentives that typically impact effort also
determine performance in this skill-based setting. Hence we enrich the model presented
in the previous section by factors that would impact performance if the task at hand was
an effort task.
If throwing darts was an effort task, the following results derived from contest the-
ory would hold. First, costly effort and hence performance would improve as financial
incentives increase (see e.g. Becker and Huselid, 1992; Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990;
Gilsdorf and Sukhatme, 2008a,b; Lynch, 2005). Prize displays the additional money to
be won in a game, i.e. the difference between the winners’ and the losers’ price money.
If throwing darts was an effort task, then the checkout probability should increase in
Prize. Second, heterogeneity in ability between contestants would reduce performance for
effort tasks as the outcome of the contest is more certain in advance and both contestants
save effort costs (see e.g. Bach et al., 2009; Backes-Gellner and Pull, 2013; Brown, 2011;
Sunde, 2009). To account for the homogeneity of players chances to win the match, the
competitive imbalance (Cb) indicates the absolute difference in the winning probabilities.
Based on betting odds from http://www.oddsportal.com/, and after correcting for the
bookmakers’ margin, they can take values between 0 and 1. High values of Cb imply that
the match is lopsided, whereas the value 0 means that both players have equal winning
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probabilities. One would expect a higher Cb to be associated with lower incentives to
perform well, hence a negative impact on the probability to check out. Third and closely
related, intermediate scores suggesting a clear lead would have similar impact on effort
and hence performance as heterogeneity between contestants abilities (see e.g. Azmat and
Iriberri, 2010; Casas-Arce and Mart´ınez-Jerez, 2009; Gu¨rtler and Harbring, 2010; Schnee-
mann and Deutscher, 2017). Here, intermediate scores indicating an asymmetric contest
reduce incentives to invest effort and hence reduces performance. The variable Diff covers
the difference in legs won at the time a dart is thrown. The larger Diff, the more lopsided
the course of play. Accordingly, if the task at hand was an effort task one would expect
a negative impact of Diff on the probability of a successful checkout. Last, if throwing
darts was an effort task, one would expect a decline in performance as the game progresses
and athletes fatigue. ThrowNumber indicates how many throws a player had made prior
to the current throw.
The descriptive statistics for the effort-related control variables are displayed in Table
9 in the Appendix, while the estimation results covering those additional control variables
are presented in Table 10. The results for the considered covariates show mostly insignif-
icant effects of the effort-related control variables on the checkout probability. Only for
the difference in the score of the match we find mixed evidence but no clear trend.
6 Discussion
We provide clear evidence that professional darts players do not choke but instead ex-
cel when facing (high) pressure situations. Player-specific effects for performance under
pressure in our models show that almost all professional players in our sample improve
their overall performance in pressure situations. Our results contradict the current state
of research, where it is widely accepted that overall performance in skill tasks decreases
with increasing pressure due to choking.
The stark difference between our findings and previous studies may partly be due to the
fact that in our study we consider very highly skilled individuals who have to deal with
the considered type of pressure situations on a regular basis. Professional darts players
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are at the very top of their profession and cannot fluke out of pressure situations, which
is possible in team settings where tasks can be assigned to different team members. In
fact, darts players face pressure situations on a regular basis and hence gain experience in
dealing with these. While throwing darts is the one skill required in the setting considered,
in other professions the set of tasks is much more diverse. With respect to previous studies,
e.g. free throws in basketball or penalty kicks in soccer display only a very small fraction
of the skills required of a player. Here, professionals can compensate weaknesses (like
choking under pressure) with other strengths.
While nearly all subjects in our sample respond positively to pressure, this does not
necessarily imply similar results for (less experienced) subjects outside of the sample
(Kamenica, 2012). Instead, our sample may to some extent be the result of selection
effects of subjects who can withstand pressure, such that only those individuals who
perform well in pressure situations succeeded in the profession at hand and made it to
the top (and hence into our sample).
The importance of coping with pressure situations has been investigated by Jones (2002)
in a qualitative study by interviewing ten international top athletes. In his study, several
attributes are stated as important factors for being “mental tough”, such as to be in
control under pressure. In a further study, Jones et al. (2007) again interview several
former Olympic or world championship winning athletes as well as sport psychologists and
coaches, finding that mentally tough athletes can not only cope with pressure situations,
but even use it to raise their performance. Jones et al. (2009) deliver an explanation for
that, stating that individuals are either entering a “competition state” or a “threat state”
when forced to pressure situations, where the former helps their performance and the
latter does not. Thus, to not choke under pressure is not a conscious decision but rather
a state of mind which is reached subconsciously. Our results suggest that the ability to
enter a state of mind which is associated with a high level of focus when facing pressure
situations (the “competition state”) may be necessary to become one of the best at a
profession.
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7 Appendix
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for the further considered covariates for the models shown
in Table 10.
n mean st. dev. min. max.
ThrowNumber 23,192 37.35 28.52 3 253
Prize 21,601 7,739 17,750 1,000 230,000
Cb 23,192 0.377 0.231 0.000 0.899
Diff 19,088 1.497 1.452 0 11
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Table 10: Estimation results for the fixed effects of the models containing further covari-
ates. The number of observations differ, since some darts tournaments such as
the Premier League start with a group stage where no prize money is awarded.
In addition, the World Championship is played in sets, which makes the inter-
mediate score incomparable with tournaments played in legs.
Response variable:
Checkout
1-Dart-Finish 2-Dart-Finish 3-Dart-Finish
OppFin1 −0.121 0.294∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.078) (0.129)
OppFin2 −0.059 0.183∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.077) (0.126)
OppFin3 −0.036 0.132 0.333∗∗
(0.152) (0.086) (0.131)
OppNoFin reference category
Exper 0.001 0.056 0.077
(0.041) (0.035) (0.054)
Cb −0.005 0.033 0.089∗
(0.039) (0.029) (0.048)
ThrowNumber −0.069 0.045 −0.009
(0.048) (0.035) (0.058)
Prize 0.023 0.041 −0.045
(0.066) (0.048) (0.086)
Diff 0.021 −0.059∗∗ −0.013
(0.038) (0.028) (0.046)
Constant 1.232∗∗∗ −0.318∗∗∗ −2.803∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.070) (0.105)
Observations 4,409 6,172 6,916
AIC 4,845 8,509 3,961
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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